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PROTECTING EMPLOYEES FROM QUID PRO QUO
NEUTRALITY ARRANGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
Throughout the past several decades, union density in the United States has
declined dramatically. One of the primary causes of this decline is staunch
opposition to unionization by employers throughout the country.
To unionize a group of employees, the union must win an election. Union
elections are supervised by the NLRB. To get the NLRB to order an election,
the union must first convince 30% of the employees to sign union authorization
cards. Once the NLRB certifies that this requirement has been met, it orders
that a secret ballot election be held. Typically, about two months pass between
card certification and the actual election. During this time period, the union
and the employer actively campaign for and against unionization.
To win the election, the union must convince more than 50% of the
employees to vote for unionization. If the union successfully does so, it is
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. The
union then begins negotiating the “first contract” between the employer and
the employees, which dictates the terms of employment.
Employers typically prefer that their employees not join a union.
Employers have developed several effective tactics for defeating attempts to
unionize their employees. These tactics include (1) vehemently opposing
unionization throughout the two-month campaign period and (2) taking
advantage of some of the weaknesses of the NLRB union elections process to
delay and ultimately derail the union campaign. These two tactics have been
very effective, resulting in steadily decreasing union density.
In response to the trend of decreasing union density, unions have
developed alternative means of unionizing new groups of employees without
using the NLRB elections process. Specifically, unions have begun convincing
employers to sign “neutrality agreements.”
The typical neutrality agreement contains two primary provisions designed
to help the union win the right to represent a group of employees. First, the
agreement contains a provision obligating the employer to remain neutral to
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unionization throughout the campaign period. Second, the agreement contains
a card check provision. A card check provision has two parts. First, the
employer waives its right to demand an NLRB-supervised secret ballot
election. Second, the employer agrees to automatically recognize the union as
the bargaining representative of its employees if a majority of those employees
sign union authorization cards. These provisions are very effective at
counteracting the employers’ antiunion tactics. In fact, neutrality agreements
with these two provisions are so effective that they can virtually guarantee that
the union will be successful in unionizing a group of employees.
Because neutrality agreements can virtually guarantee unionization,
employers typically will not sign one. There are, however, two ways to get an
employer to sign a neutrality agreement. First, employers can be coerced.
Employers can be coerced in many ways, including through the use of public
opinion campaigns or as part of a settlement in litigation. Second, a union can
bargain for a neutrality agreement. Employers will sign neutrality agreements
if they are given something of great value in exchange. Bargained-for
neutrality agreements are the focus of this Comment.
When bargaining for neutrality agreements, what might the union offer the
employer? Recently, unions have begun trading substantive first-contract
concessions, which are highly valuable to employers, for neutrality
agreements. A union that has not been recognized as the bargaining
representative for a group of employees meets with the employer before the
two-month election campaign takes place. The union tells the employer that if
it signs a neutrality agreement, the union will contractually agree in advance
to certain provisions that the employer wants in its contract with its employees.
Once the union wins the election, it honors the contractual promise it made
and allows those provisions to become part of the first contract between the
employer and its employees, whom the union now represents.
Essentially, the employer is able to ensure that if the union successfully
unionizes its employees, the union will be contractually bound to act in the
interests of the employer. Thus, the employer is able to mitigate, to some
extent, the effects of unionization. Because this type of neutrality agreement
creates the potential for corruption, many have argued that it should be barred
by section 302 of the Labor and Management Relations Act, which is supposed
to prevent corruption.
Third and Fourth Circuit decisions in 2004 and 2008 addressed this issue
and held that neutrality agreements cannot violate section 302 of the LMRA
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despite a variety of contrary arguments. However, in 2012, the Eleventh
Circuit split with the Third and Fourth Circuits, holding that in some situations
these agreements can violate section 302.
This Comment first discusses this circuit split and points out numerous
problems with the arguments set forth in the Third and Fourth Circuit
opinions. Then, this Comment argues that because of these problems, as well
as the potential for corruption created by the Third and Fourth Circuit
decisions, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is correct. Finally, this Comment
proposes changes to the LMRA and the National Labor Relations Act that
would serve as a solution to the problems created by neutrality agreements.
These changes would also make the need for judicial review of future
agreements under the Eleventh Circuit framework less necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent Eleventh Circuit decision in Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355
has created a split between the Eleventh Circuit on one side and the Third and
Fourth Circuits on the other.1 At issue in the split is a dispute over the correct
interpretation of section 302 of the Labor and Management Relations Act
(LMRA). Subsection (a) of section 302 makes it unlawful for an employer to
pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or
other thing of value . . . to any labor organization, or any officer or
employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would
2
admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer.

Section 302 also makes it illegal for a union or union representative “to
request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment,
loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection
(a).”3 The courts are split over whether organizing assistance given to a labor
union by an employer in the form of a pre-recognition “neutrality agreement”
constitutes a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 302.4
But what is a neutrality agreement? When a union wants to unionize a new
group of employees, it must first convince at least 30% of the employees to
sign authorization cards.5 If the union successfully does so, the union then
submits the cards to the NLRB for certification.6 If the NLRB certifies that the
union has secured cards from 30% of the employees, it orders that a secret
ballot election be held where the employees vote on whether to unionize.7
Typically, about two months pass between the time the NLRB certifies the
cards and the time that the election actually takes place.8 During these two
months, the union and the employer actively campaign for or against
unionization.9 At the election, if a majority of employees vote to unionize, then
1 See 667 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374
(4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219
(3d Cir. 2004).
2 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012); see also Adcock,
550 F.3d at 374.
3 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1).
4 See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1214.
5 Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1775 (1983).
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 See id. at 1777.
9 Id. at 1775.
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the NLRB recognizes the union as the sole bargaining representative of the
employees.10 The employer is then required by statute to bargain in good faith
with the union to negotiate the “first contract” between the employees and the
employer.11 This employment contract determines the terms and conditions for
all employees represented by the union.12
Neutrality agreements are a relatively new tool being used by unions to
ensure their success in the union election process.13 Neutrality agreements are
agreements between the union and the employer.14 They are made before the
union begins soliciting authorization cards to submit to the NLRB for
certification.15 The provisions of these agreements, discussed in more detail in
Part II, overcome the weaknesses of the NLRB elections process that cause
unions to fail. For reasons discussed in Part II, neutrality agreements can
virtually guarantee that a union will be successful in its campaign to unionize a
new group of employees.16
New union members pay anywhere from thirty to fifty dollars per month in
member dues, which can potentially result in hundreds of thousands of dollars
in dues per month for the union depending on the number of employees.17
Because of the value of neutrality agreements to the unions in securing new
union members, unions are willing to pay for them.18 In Mulhall, for example,
the union agreed to spend money to lobby in support of legislation favorable to
the employer.19 The union ultimately spent over $100,000 on lobbying
efforts.20 Accordingly, in Mulhall the Eleventh Circuit held that a neutrality

10

Id.
See id. at 1775, 1810, 1819. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended by
the LMRA, imposes a duty on the employer to bargain in good faith with the union selected by its employees.
See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); see also Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775
n.17 (citing section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain collectively with the union).
12 See Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775.
13 Neutrality agreements began being widely used as part of “union organizing strategy” in the 1990s.
Roger C. Hartley, Non-legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The
Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 378 (2001).
14 Id. at 372.
15 See id.
16 Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 695, 722–23 (2012).
17 Id. at 730.
18 See, e.g., Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012).
19 See id.
20 Id.
11
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agreement can constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 302
of the LMRA in certain situations.21
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in Mulhall
is correct, but that section 302 should nevertheless be amended to make it
better at achieving its purpose: “curb[ing] abuses that Congress felt were
‘inimical to the integrity of the collective bargaining process.’”22
This Comment suggests three reasons why the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Mulhall is more appropriate than the decisions of the Third and Fourth
Circuits in Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage
Hospitality Resources, LLC and Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, respectively.
First, the reasoning in the Hotel Employees and Adcock decisions is unsound.
The weaknesses of these opinions are detailed in Part IV.
Second, this Comment suggests that the Mulhall decision was correct in
determining that a neutrality agreement can be considered a “thing of value”
within the meaning of section 302 because neutrality agreements are, in fact,
valuable. They are valuable because they can virtually guarantee that the union
will be successful in unionizing new groups of employees, who are then
required to pay substantial sums of money in dues to the union.23 Thus, under
the plain language of section 302, a neutrality agreement could be considered a
“thing of value.”24
Third, this Comment argues that because neutrality agreements are valuable
to unions, their existence yields a potential for corruption, which section 302 of
the LMRA was designed to prevent.25 Unions have recently found a way to get
neutrality agreements for free.26 Rather than agreeing to pay for neutrality
agreements with money, unions have begun conceding employees’ contract

21

See id. at 1215.
Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359
U.S. 419, 425 (1959)).
23 Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722−23, 730.
24 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2012); see also
Adcock, 550 F.3d at 374.
25 See Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 425−26 (noting that congressional concern for corruption garnered popular
support for passing section 302 of the LMRA).
26 See, e.g., Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730–31 (discussing how unions bargain using
employees’ contract rights).
22
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rights in exchange for neutrality agreements before even being recognized as
the representative of those employees.27
Before soliciting authorization cards from employees, the union approaches
the employer and asks the employer to sign a neutrality agreement.28 To get the
employer to sign the agreement, the union includes provisions in the agreement
that guarantee that the first contract between the employer and employees will
adhere to certain guidelines or contain certain provisions favorable to the
employer.29 For example, the neutrality agreement might contain a provision
that states that any collective bargaining agreement reached between the union
and the employer on behalf of the employees will contain a provision allowing
the employer to impose mandatory overtime.30
With the help of the neutrality agreement, the union then wins the election
campaign and becomes the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees.31 Then, when the union goes to negotiate a contract with the
employer on behalf of the employees, it honors the promises it made in
exchange for the neutrality agreement by allowing the agreed-upon provisions
to become part of the first employment contract.32 This results in contract
terms favorable to the employer. Thus, the employer is able to mitigate, to
some extent, the effects of unionization by binding the union to specific,
favorable contract terms before the union even unionizes the employees.
This is a great arrangement for the union and the employer. The union gets
a group of new members who are required to pay it large sums of money in
member dues.33 The employer does not have to worry about the union making
costly demands on behalf of the newly unionized employees because it has
already negotiated for favorable contract terms in exchange for the neutrality
agreement. Everyone wins except for the employees, whose rights were
sacrificed by the union in exchange for the neutrality agreement before they
even joined the union.

27 See, e.g., Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *1 (Dec. 6, 2010). Among other
things, the union in Dana Corp. agreed to the inclusion of a mandatory overtime provision in any future
employee contract. See id. at *3.
28 See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730–31.
29 See, e.g., Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215.
30 See Dana Corp., 2010 WL 4963202, at *2–3.
31 See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722–23.
32 See id. at 731.
33 Id. at 730.
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Should unions be allowed to concede the rights of employees they do not
yet represent in exchange for a neutrality agreement? That question was
addressed in the 2010 NLRB decision Dana Corp.34 In Dana Corp., the NLRB
held that the answer in many cases is yes, but that it depends on the specific
provisions of each agreement.35 Thus, under Dana Corp., this type of quid pro
quo agreement between the unions and the employers could be perfectly
legal.36 Then came the 2012 Mulhall decision, in which the Eleventh Circuit
held that such an agreement was unlawful if it were being used as “valuable
consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from an
employer.”37
This Comment argues that the Mulhall decision is correct because it takes
into account the potential for corruption inherent in this type of neutrality
agreement and creates an appropriate standard for reviewing neutrality
agreements in the future. However, judicial review of every questionable
neutrality agreement to determine its legality is time consuming and expensive.
Thus, Part V of this Comment proposes changes to both the LMRA and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that will help eliminate the potential for
corruption as well as reduce the need for judicial review of neutrality
agreements to determine their legality.
I. SECTION 302 OF THE LABOR AND MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
(TAFT-HARTLEY ACT)
Section 302 of the Labor and Management Relations Act, also known as
the Taft-Hartley Act,38 makes it illegal for an employer to “agree to pay, lend,
or deliver, any money or other thing of value” to a union, or an officer or
employee of a union who represents or seeks to represent its employees.39 It
also makes it illegal for a union or union officer to “request, demand, receive,
or accept . . . any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of
value.”40 The penalty for violation of the statute depends on the value of the
34

2010 WL 4963202, at *3–4.
See id. at *11.
36 See id. at *12.
37 Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012).
38 The LMRA/Taft-Hartley Act was an amendment to the NLRA. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S.
419, 425 (1959).
39 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012). The statute
includes a list of exceptions without which it would be overly broad. These exceptions are outside the scope of
this Comment.
40 Id. § 186(b)(1).
35

BOWNESS GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

6/30/2014 2:01 PM

PROTECTING EMPLOYEES FROM QUID PRO QUO

1507

illegal transaction.41 If the value of the transaction is greater than $1,000 and
the violation is performed willfully and with intent to benefit oneself or others,
the offense is a felony and the guilty party is subject to a fine of up to $15,000
and up to five years in prison.42 If, however, the value of the transaction is
$1,000 or less, the offense is a misdemeanor and the guilty party is subject to a
fine of up to $10,000 and up to one year in prison.43
Though the language of the statute is vague,44 its purpose is clear—to
prevent bribery and corruption in the context of the collective bargaining
process.45 In Arroyo v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that Congress
passed section 302 of the LMRA to curb abuses “inimical to the integrity of
the collective bargaining process.”46 In this light, the Second Circuit has held
that whether something is a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 302
depends on the circumstances of the case, stating that “[v]alue is usually set by
the desire to have the ‘thing’ and depends upon the individual and the
circumstances.”47
II. NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. Background
Neutrality agreements are tools that are increasingly being used by unions
to help them organize new groups of employees.48 A neutrality agreement is an
agreement between an employer and a labor union, and it is made when the
41

See id. § 186(d)(1).
Id.
43 Id.
44 What is a “thing of value?”
45 See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1959); see also Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local
355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012); Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008);
Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 218–19 (3d Cir.
2004).
46 359 U.S. at 425. The Court in Arroyo stated that “[t]hose members of Congress who supported
[section 302 of the LMRA] were concerned with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of
employee representatives.” Id. at 425–26. The court cited Senator Byrd saying that section 302 “would prevent
an employer from paying a royalty to the representative of a union. [The employer] would be clearly liable,
under the provisions of [section 302], if he paid a royalty or other money to the representative of a labor union,
the purpose of which was to bribe that representative.” Id. at 426 n.7 (quoting 92 CONG. REC. 4,893 (1946)).
47 United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that “a loan may reasonably be
included within the wording of the statute and that the Congress so intended”).
48 Ralph M. Silberman, Understanding Card Checks and Neutrality Agreements, EMP. ALERT, May 26,
2005, at 1 (“80% of 400,000 new unionized workers were organized through card checks and neutrality
agreements.”).
42
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labor union decides it wants to try to unionize the employer’s employees.49 To
unionize a group of employees, the union must win the right to represent them
in their dealings with the employer by achieving the support of a majority of
the employees.50 The purpose of a neutrality agreement is to make it easier for
the union to do so.51
Neutrality agreements are made before a union begins the campaign to
unionize the employees.52 Most neutrality agreements contain two primary
provisions. First, the employer agrees to remain neutral to the union’s efforts to
unionize its employees rather than campaigning against unionization.53 This
neutrality provision is why they are called “neutrality agreements.” Second, the
employer will typically agree to card check recognition.54 “[B]y agreeing to
card-check recognition,” the employer is waiving its right to demand an
NLRB-supervised secret ballot election55 and agreeing that it will
automatically recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
its employees if a majority of its employees sign union authorization cards.56
B. The Value of Neutrality Agreements
Neutrality agreements have been extremely effective at helping unions
unionize new groups of employees because they circumvent some of the
primary problems with the NLRB elections process.57 These problems include

49 See Hartley, supra note 13, at 372; see also Joseph A. Barker, Keeping Neutrality Agreements Neutral,
MICH. B.J., Aug. 2005, at 33, 34.
50 See Hartley, supra note 13, at 383 n.72.
51 See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775 (discussing the “elaborate” formal procedure for achieving
union representation).
52 See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 13, at 372.
53 See id. at 379 (noting that neutrality provisions impose one of two degrees of neutrality on the
employer: either (1) “employers waive their right to communicate their views about the union⎯a pledge of
complete neutrality,” or (2) employers agree to only a “partial waiver of their right to communicate with
employees during the organizing period”).
54 See id. at 382−83 & n.72.
55 Id. at 383; see Silberman, supra note 48. In the absence of a card check arrangement, the only way for
a union to win the right to represent a group of employees is to win greater than 50% of the vote in an NLRBsupervised secret ballot election.
56 See Hartley, supra note 13, at 383 & n.72 (“Card check recognition agreements are now a standard
provision in neutrality agreements. . . . There are variations in the form that card-check agreements take, of
course. One of the most important is the requirement that a union possess a super-majority showing of support,
often 65 percent, before the obligation to recognize the union attaches. A super-majority precondition to cardcheck recognition is neither unprecedented nor particularly onerous for unions.” (footnote omitted)). For a
general description of the union organizing campaign and card check process, see Silberman, supra note 48.
57 See Hartley, supra note 13, at 372−73.
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“employer intimidation . . . and inability to secure a first contract.”58 Until
recently, these problems resulted in a very low union success rate in NLRBsupervised representation elections.59
1. Employer Intimidation and Antiunion Speech
With the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, Congress created a formal
procedure by which unions could unionize new groups of workers, securing
the right to bargain with their employer on their behalf.60 To obtain that right, a
union must first get at least 30% of the employees in a bargaining unit61 to sign
authorization cards.62 Once 30% of the employees in the unit have signed
cards, the union submits a petition for certification to the NLRB.63 If the
NLRB concludes that the conditions for an election to take place have been
satisfied, a secret ballot election takes place in which the employees vote to
decide whether to join the union.64 Typically, about two months pass between
the time the union submits its petition and the time the election takes place.65
During this time, the employer has the opportunity to campaign against
unionization.66
The NLRA contains provisions designed to prevent the employer from
intimidating employees into voting against unionization.67 These provisions
attempt to do so by regulating the employer’s conduct during the campaign.68
However, these provisions have not been effective in the past.69
For example, it is a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA for an
employer to discourage unionization by firing employees during the campaign
period leading up to the election.70 However, the remedy for violation of
section 8(a)(3)⎯reinstatement of the employee with backpay⎯is not an
58

Id. at 372.
See id. at 372–73.
60 See Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775.
61 The term “bargaining unit” means “[a] group of employees authorized to engage in collective
bargaining on behalf of all the employees of a company or an industry sector.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170
(9th ed. 2009).
62 Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1777.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 1777−78.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 1777.
70 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
59
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effective deterrent.71 Once fired, the employee no longer has the right to vote
in the election and by the time he is reinstated, the election will have long since
passed.72 The only thing the employer risks by firing the employee is having to
pay the employee backpay.73
Moreover, firing pro-union employees “gives a chilling edge to the warning
that union representation is likely to be more trouble for the employees than it
is worth.”74 Econometric research has shown that an antiunion campaign
coupled with discriminatory firings in violation of the NLRA has a profoundly
negative effect on the union’s ability to win the election.75 Not surprisingly
then, “[u]nion leaders regard employer anti-union speech as a leading cause of
union organizing failure.”76
The weaknesses of the NLRB-supervised election process resulted in
decreasing union election success rates from the period between 1950 and
1985.77 Success rates in representation elections fell from 74% in 1950 to just
48% in 1980.78 Union success rates had only climbed back to 50% by 2000.79
As a result, as of 2012, union members account for only 11.8% of the total
workforce and just 6.9% of the private workforce.80
However, unions have found that they can dramatically increase their
chances of a successful unionization campaign by bypassing the NLRB

71

Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788−89 (“[T]he traditional remedies for discriminatory discharge⎯backpay
and reinstatement⎯simply are not effective deterrents to employers who are tempted to trample on their
employees’ rights.” (footnote omitted)).
72 See id. at 1788.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 1778.
75 See id. at 1786 (citing W. Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)) (commenting on an empirical study
by William Dickens that found that unions would have won 53%–75% of the elections sampled had the
employers not campaigned, versus only 3%–10% “if every employer had campaigned with the highest
intensity and greatest illegality identified in the sample,” and noting that “[a] protracted representation
campaign, punctuated by discriminatory discharges and other reprisals against union supporters, can have a
pronounced effect on the ultimate election verdict”).
76 Hartley, supra note 13, at 379.
77 See 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 11−15 (1985); Hartley, supra note 13, at 370–71; Weiler, supra note 5, at
1776−77; Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (1984).
78 See Weiler, supra note 5, at 1776 tbl.1.
79 65 NLRB ANN. REP. 13 (2000).
80 Sam Hananel, Union Membership Up Slightly, Outlook in Doubt, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/money/workplace/story/2012-01-27/union-membership-growing/52817346/1 (last updated Jan.
27, 2012).
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elections process altogether through the use of a neutrality agreement with a
card check provision.81 The card check provision allows the union to avoid the
prolonged, two-month campaign period leading up to the NLRB-supervised
election by avoiding the election altogether.82 And, during the relatively short
period of time in which the union will be trying to get employees to sign
authorization cards, the neutrality provision of the agreement prevents the
employer from engaging in antiunion speech.83 Due to their effectiveness,
neutrality agreements emerged as a “fixture” of union organizing strategy in
the 1990s.84
A study published in 2001 found that in the 1990s, where union organizing
campaigns employed neutrality agreements with card check provisions, they
had a 78% success rate.85 During the same time period in which these data
were collected, the overall union success rate in NLRB elections hovered
around 47%.86 This is a 31% difference.
More importantly, the 78% success rate actually understates the
effectiveness of neutrality agreements.87 Recall that 30% of a company’s
employees must sign authorization cards before an NLRB election can be
held.88 However, in nearly every case where a union solicits enough cards to
allow the NLRB to order an election, more than 50% of the employees
ultimately sign authorization cards.89 Thus, in nearly every case in which an
NLRB election is held, the union would have been able to automatically gain
recognition without having an election if it had secured a neutrality agreement
with a 50% card check provision.90
81

See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722−23; see also Hartley, supra note 13, at 379.
See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722.
83 See id. at 721–22.
84 Hartley, supra note 13, at 378.
85 See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 45, 52 (2001); see also Silberman, supra note 48.
86 See NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 79, at 13; Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 85, at 45 (noting that data for
the study were collected in 1997 and 1998).
87 Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722−23.
88 Weiler, supra note 5, at 1775; see also Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722.
89 Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722−23.
90 Id. at 723. Union success rates are the focus of groups involved with formulating U.S. labor policy. See
id. This focus stems from the belief on one side that union density is better for everyone, and on the other that
the opposite is true. Much of the political discourse related to unions is centered on policies designed to either
increase or decrease union density. See, e.g., Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2.
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) is an excellent recent example. Had it been passed, the EFCA would
have altered the NLRB elections process, mandating that the NLRB certify a union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the unit if a majority of the employees in the unit signed authorization cards. Id. Essentially,
82
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2. First Contract
Once a union has won the right to represent a group of employees, the
union still has a long way to go. Winning the right to represent the employees
“gives the union no more than the right to sit across the bargaining table from
the employer.”91 The union must still successfully negotiate a “first contract”
with the employer that will dictate the terms of the employer/employee
relationship.92
Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes a duty on the employer to bargain in
good faith with the union.93 However, this duty has been interpreted extremely
narrowly by the Supreme Court.94 As a result, the employer can still force an
impasse in its negotiations with the union. The only defense a union has
against a savvy employer determined to force an impasse is the threat of a
strike.95 However, this tactic has its own set of limitations.96 As a result, new
unions fail to achieve a first contract in approximately 40% of cases.97
Unions can circumvent this problem in advance by using neutrality
agreements with provisions designed to help it achieve a first contract.98 First,
they could include provisions that require “[i]nterest arbitration of unresolved
first-contract issues if negotiations are not satisfactorily concluded by a time
[to be made] certain following recognition.”99 For reasons not germane to this
Comment, these types of provisions are uncommon.100 Second, unions can
attempt to contractually bind employers to specific contract terms or guidelines
in the neutrality agreement that will govern first-contract negotiations once the

it takes away the secret ballot election and mandates card check recognition for all union campaigns. See id.
Because swapping to card check recognition dramatically increases the unions’ success rates in representation
elections, the effect of the EFCA would probably have been to increase union density.
91 Weiler, supra note 77, at 352.
92 See id.
93 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
94 The Court’s rationale being that the principle of freedom of contract governs the relationship between
the employer and the union selected to represent the employer’s employees. See Weiler, supra note 77, at
357−60. Moreover, the statute itself states that this duty “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). To top it off, in the unlikely event that the NLRB
finds that the employer violated its duty, the only real remedy available is an NLRB order for the employer to
comply with the duty in the future. Weiler, supra note 77, at 360.
95 Weiler, supra note 77, at 361−62.
96 See id.
97 Hartley, supra note 13, at 386.
98 See id. at 386–87.
99 Id. at 386 n.94.
100 See id.
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union wins the election.101 These types of neutrality agreements, discussed in
Part III below, were authorized by the NLRB’s decision in Dana Corp. and are
the focus of this Comment.102
Because neutrality agreements can dramatically increase the union’s chance
of successfully gaining recognition, as well as help it achieve a first contract,
they are clearly of some value to a union seeking to organize a new group of
employees. Despite their apparent value, the Third and Fourth Circuits have
held that under no circumstances can a neutrality agreement constitute a “thing
of value” within the meaning of section 302 of the LMRA.103 Their reasoning,
discussed in Part IV, was extremely flawed.
III. PERVERSE INCENTIVES (DANA CORP.)
Because neutrality agreements are valuable to unions, they are willing to
pay for them. In exchange for a neutrality agreement, the union might offer any
number of things. For example, the union might offer political influence in
support of legislation favorable to the employer,104 or bargaining concessions
effective when the union achieves recognition.105 Of particular interest to this
Comment are situations where the union agrees to the latter. It is this type of
neutrality agreement where the potential for corruption exists.106 This type of
neutrality agreement was the subject of a recent major NLRB decision, Dana
Corp.107
Dana Corp. involved a recent trend whereby unions have begun trading
contract concessions for neutrality agreements.108 Before beginning a
101 See generally, e.g., Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16 (arguing that the parties could contract to behave
ethically).
102 Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6, 2010).
103 See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps.
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
104 For example, the union in Mulhall agreed to help campaign in support of legislation favorable to the
employer and eventually spent $100,000 on campaign efforts. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d
1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012).
105 Hartley, supra note 13, at 390. Professor Hartley notes, however, that doing so “would be unavailable
following a successful, but contentious, organizing campaign.” Id. Such concessions might include promises
from the union “to refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking, or undertaking other economic activity against
[the employer]” if recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. Mulhall, 667 F.3d
at 1213. Alternatively, an employer might be required to have signed a neutrality agreement to bid on some
government contracts or receive some benefit from the government. See Hotel Emps., 390 F.3d at 208–09.
106 See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730−31.
107 2010 WL 4963202, at *1.
108 See id.; Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730–31.
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campaign to unionize the employees, the union approaches the employer and
requests that it enter into a neutrality agreement.109 In exchange, the union
agrees that, should it successfully unionize the employees, any employment
contract it negotiates on their behalf will contain certain provisions favorable
to the employer.110 With the help of the neutrality agreement, the union then
unionizes the employees, who are required to pay the union large sums of
money in dues.111 Once unionized, the union honors the promise it made in
exchange for the neutrality agreement and allows the agreed-upon provisions
to become part of the first employment contract.112 The question is, under the
NLRA, can the union agree to specific, substantive contract provisions with the
employer before it has even unionized the employees?
Sections 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA make it illegal to negotiate a
full, binding collective bargaining agreement before the union has achieved
majority support of the employees it is trying to unionize.113 Thus, neutrality
agreements that contain pre-recognition bargaining concessions are subject to
challenge based on the argument that they constitute a full collective
bargaining agreement.114 While neutrality agreements can contain guidelines as
to what the full collective bargaining agreement will eventually look like
should the union secure recognition, the neutrality agreement must fall short of
being a complete collective bargaining agreement.115 And, even if the
neutrality agreement only contains guidelines, it might still be subject to a
challenge that it goes too far to confer premature legitimacy onto a union that
has not achieved majority support of the employees.116
The line between what is permissible and what is a violation of the NLRA
is not clear. Prior to 2010, the only NLRB case that addressed this issue was
Majestic Weaving Co.117 In Majestic Weaving, the employer prematurely
recognized a union as the exclusive bargaining representative before the union
109

See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730–31.
See id. In Dana Corp., for example, the union agreed that once it unionized the employees, it would
allow the employer to include a mandatory overtime provision in its contract with the employees. 2010 WL
4963202, at *2–3.
111 Depending on the size of the bargaining unit, the union might receive “[h]undreds of thousands of
dollars per month” in new member dues. Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
112 See id. at 731.
113 Barker, supra note 49, at 35 (discussing the boundaries of permissible pre-recognition contract
negotiations).
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).
110
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had secured the signatures of a majority of the employees.118 The employer
also entered into a full collective bargaining contract with the “minority
union.”119 Some of the employees sued, alleging that the employer’s conduct
violated the NLRA.120 The NLRB ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that
an employer may not lawfully reach a collective bargaining agreement with a
union “whose majority support comes after, and follows from, the agreement
itself.”121 The NLRB reasoned that by forming a binding agreement with the
union before the campaign, the employer was conferring a “deceptive cloak of
authority” on the union, giving it an advantage in securing the votes of the
employees.122
In 2010, the NLRB addressed the issue of pre-recognition bargaining
concessions again with its decision in Dana Corp.123 In Dana Corp., the
employer and the union entered into a neutrality agreement with a card check
provision.124 In this agreement, the employer and the union agreed that if the
union were to successfully unionize the employees, any future collective
bargaining agreement the union might reach with the employer would
(a) be at least four years in duration, (b) include health insurance
cost-sharing, (c) address the importance of attendance to productivity
and quality, (d) include a minimum number of classifications,
(e) incorporate team-based approaches and continuous improvement,
(f) have flexible compensation policies, and (g) provide for
125
mandatory overtime when necessary.

The agreement also included two other important provisions. The first was a
provision by which the terms of the collective bargaining agreement would be
decided at arbitration if the parties reached an impasse in their negotiations.126
118

See id. at 860.
See id. at 861.
120 See id.
121 NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, MORGAN LEWIS 2 (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LEPG_LF_NLRBApprovesPrerecognitionEmployer-UnionBargaining_
09dec10.pdf.
122 Barker, supra note 49, at 35 (quoting Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,
736 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union
Bargaining, supra note 121, at 2.
123 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6, 2010). Dana Corp. was a 2–1 decision, with the
dissenting member arguing that the majority was overruling the precedent set by Majestic Weaving, despite the
fact that NLRB precedent cannot be overruled without the support of less than a three-member majority. See
id. at *14 (Hayes, Member, dissenting).
124 NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 1.
125 Id.
126 Id.
119
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And the second was a no-strike/no-lockout clause.127 Although the employees
were informed of the existence of a neutrality agreement between their
employer and the union prior to the union election campaign taking place, they
were not informed of the specific terms of the agreement.128 Thus, the
employees were unaware that if they voted to unionize, they would be
subjecting themselves to mandatory overtime.
Several employees sued after the union won recognition, arguing that the
agreement violated Sections 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.129 The
NLRB issued a 2–1 decision, holding that the agreement did not violate the
NLRA because it “did no more than create a framework for future collective
bargaining, if . . . the [union] were first able to provide proof of majority
status.”130 The NLRB distinguished the facts of Dana Corp. from those of
Majestic Weaving, where the employer had officially recognized a union that
had not achieved majority support from the employees.131 However, the NLRB
noted that whether a given pre-recognition agreement is lawful “depend[s] on
the context in which [the] agreement is adopted and the conduct that
accompanies it.”132 As such, the legality of these types of pre-recognition
agreements must be determined on a case-by-case basis.133
With the Dana Corp. decision, the NLRB has limited its holding in
Majestic Weaving to situations in which an employer recognizes a union before
it achieves majority support.134 As a result, employers and unions can more
freely enter neutrality agreements that dictate the provisions of any future
collective bargaining agreement they might reach.135 This is beneficial to the
unions because it gives them more to bargain with when attempting to
persuade an employer to enter into a neutrality agreement.136 Rather than
paying for the neutrality agreement with its own resources, the union can pay
for the agreement with a contractual promise to cede certain employee rights137
127

Dana Corp., 2010 WL 4963202, at *2.
NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 2.
129 Id.
130 Dana Corp., 2010 WL 4963202, at *8.
131 See id.; see also Jonah J. Lalas, Recent Cases, Taking the Fear Out of Organizing: Dana II and Union
Neutrality Agreements, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 541–42 (2011).
132 NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 2.
133 Id.
134 See Lalas, supra note 131, at 541.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 For example, the employees’ right to refuse to allow a mandatory overtime provision to be included in
the contract.
128
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once it wins the right to represent those employees with the help of the
neutrality agreement.
Before, negotiations related to the organizing campaign had to be kept
separate from negotiations related to the actual substance of the contract
between the union and the employer, with the latter taking place after the
union had achieved recognition.138 After Dana Corp., the union and the
employer can mix the substantive contract negotiations with negotiations over
the organizing campaign, at least to a certain extent.139 That is, unions can
make concessions related to the rights of the employees in exchange for the
employer’s pledge of neutrality. The extent to which the union can make such
concessions is unclear after the Dana Corp. decision. What is clear, however,
is that in at least some circumstances, the union can make significant, binding
concessions, such as agreeing to a mandatory overtime provision, prior to
unionizing the employees.140
This presents a problem. The ability of a union to concede the rights of
employees it does not represent in exchange for a neutrality agreement that
will help it secure that very right creates perverse incentives for the union and
the employer. The employer can reduce and potentially eliminate the effects of
unionization by using a neutrality agreement to bind the union to favorable
contract terms before the unionization campaign even begins.141 In return, the
union gets the neutrality agreement, which virtually guarantees its success in
unionizing the employees.142 The victory means a new group of members must
pay union dues, which can be substantial.143 If it is true that a neutrality
agreement can ensure that the union is successful in unionizing the employees,
then it follows that the agreement is worth to the union whatever it gains in
new member dues.144 Despite the apparent value of neutrality agreements to
unions, and despite their potential for corruption, which section 302 of the

138

See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *7–8 (Dec. 6, 2010).
See id. at *12.
140 See id. at *2–3. Other examples of concessions made in exchange for neutrality agreements include (1)
agreeing that “there would be no provisions for severance pay . . . in the event of a layoff or plant closure,” (2)
agreeing that “there would be no strikes during the term of any collectively bargained agreement,” and (3)
agreeing that “there would be no wage adjustments provided at any newly organized facility prior to” a certain
date. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2008) (omission in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
141 See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730−31.
142 Id. at 722−23.
143 See id. at 730.
144 See id. at 730−31.
139
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LMRA was designed to prevent, the Third and Fourth Circuits have held that
under no circumstances can a neutrality agreement violate section 302.145
IV. THE SPLIT
A. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit was the first to address whether neutrality agreements
can violate section 302 of the LMRA in Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC.146 In that
case, a labor union sued an employer to enforce a neutrality agreement that the
two parties had previously executed.147 The neutrality agreement contained
three relevant provisions: (1) a binding arbitration provision; (2) a card check
provision, by which the employer agreed to recognize the union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees if a majority of the
employees signed authorization cards; and (3) a promise by the union to refrain
from picketing, striking, or boycotting the employer.148
After soliciting authorization cards from employees, the cards were
counted.149 The initial count revealed that less than a majority of employees
had signed authorization cards.150 The union attempted to contest the initial
card count in arbitration, but the employer refused to comply.151 The plaintiff
filed suit to compel arbitration.152 The defendant argued that the neutrality
agreement containing the arbitration provision was illegal as a violation of
section 302 and was thus void.153
The trial court held for the plaintiff, stating that
(1) both parties were within their rights to reach a private agreement
to provide an alternative method of deciding union representation and
that such chosen method . . . was not illegal under federal law; [and]
(2) the Agreement’s provisions for card check procedures did not

145 See Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375; Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res.,
LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2004).
146 See 390 F.3d at 207, 210.
147 Id. at 209−10.
148 Id. at 209.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 209−10.
153 Id. at 210.
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constitute payment of ‘things of value’ prohibited by section 302 of
154
the Labor Management Relations Act.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the trial court.155 The
court’s reasoning was circular. First, the court framed the issue by stating,
When Congress enacted section 302, it was “concerned with
corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee
representatives by employers, with extortion by employee
representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of the
power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their
sole control.” . . .
Not surprisingly, [the defendant] is unable to provide any legal
support for the remarkable assertion that entering into a valid labor
agreement governing recognition of a labor union amounts to illegal
156
labor bribery.

By framing the defendant’s argument in this way, the court was trying to imply
that the argument was absurd. However, the court unfairly framed the issue by
stating that the neutrality agreement was a “valid labor agreement.”157 Of
course there is no support for the argument that a valid labor agreement is
invalid. The validity of the agreement was the very issue the court was
supposed to be deciding. The court’s reasoning was remarkably circular.
Second, the court stated that because section 302 bars agreements to “pay,
lend, or deliver . . . any money or other thing of value,” the neutrality
agreement at issue did not amount to illegal bribery because it did not involve
the “payment, loan, or delivery of anything.”158 The court’s reasoning is
problematic because it opens a tremendous hole in the statute. Essentially, it
allows employers to circumvent the purpose of the statute⎯the prevention of
corruption⎯by bribing the union with something intangible, like a neutrality
agreement, even though the intangible is of tremendous value.159
Finally, the court stated that “[t]he fact that a Neutrality Agreement⎯like
any other labor arbitration agreement⎯benefits both parties with efficiency
and cost saving does not transform it into a payment or delivery of some
154

Id.
Id. at 219.
156 Id. at 218−19 (emphasis added) (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1959)).
157 Id. at 219.
158 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29
U.S.C. § 186(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 See supra Part II.B.
155
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benefit.”160 This statement begs the question: why not? “Efficiency and cost
savings” are both benefits. In any event, the neutrality agreement delivers
much more than “efficiency and cost saving” to the union.161 It delivers new
members, who are required to pay dues to the union.162 These dues can be
substantial, depending upon the size of the bargaining unit.163
B. Fourth Circuit
The question of whether a pre-recognition neutrality agreement can be
considered a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 302 of the LMRA
was next addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Adcock v. Freightliner LLC.164 In
Adcock, four employees sued alleging that two agreements made between the
employer and the union violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and section 302
of the LMRA.165 The first agreement was a neutrality agreement with a card
check provision, by which the employer agreed to
forego a National Labor Relations Board election if a majority of the
bargaining unit employees chose the Union as their exclusive
bargaining representative by signing authorization cards. . . . [and] to:
(1) require some of its employees to attend, on paid company time,
Union presentations explaining the Card Check Agreement; (2)
provide the Union reasonable access to nonwork areas in company
plants to allow Union representatives to meet with employees; and
(3) refrain from making negative comments about the Union during
166
the organizing campaigns.

The employees alleged that this neutrality agreement violated section 302.167 In
exchange for this neutrality agreement, the union signed a “preconditions
agreement” in which it made the following pre-recognition bargaining
concessions:
(1) there would be “separate consideration in terms and conditions of
employment for each Business Unit because of industry differences
(trucks, parts, busses, fire and rescue, chassis) including competitive
wage and benefits packages within comparative product markets”;

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Hotel Emps., 390 F.3d at 219.
See id. at 209, 219; Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730; see supra Part III.
Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
See 550 F.3d 369, 371 (4th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 371−73.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 373.
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(2) there would be “no guaranteed employment or transfer rights
between Business Units or Plants”; (3) there would be “no provisions
for severance pay . . . in the event of a layoff or plant closure”;
(4) there would be “no strikes during the term of any collectively
bargained agreement”; (5) there would be “no subcontracting
prohibitions, provided economics reflect non-competitiveness”;
(6) future “benefits cost increases, in excess of normal inflation, will
be shared between the Company and the employees proportionately
at a rate to be determined between the Company and its employees”;
and (7) in consideration of Freightliner’s financial turnaround
objectives, there would be “no wage adjustments provided at any
168
newly organized facility prior to mid-2003.”

The employees argued that this preconditions agreement violated
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.169 Prior to the case reaching the Fourth Circuit,
the NLRB determined that by executing the preconditions agreement, the
union and employer violated section 8(a)(3) by “bargaining and entering into
an agreement regarding employee terms and conditions of employment prior to
the [Union] enjoying the support of a majority of employees.”170 The unfair
labor practices charges were settled, with the parties agreeing not to honor the
preconditions agreement.171 Note that this case was decided in 2008, two years
before the Dana Corp. decision.172 Following the Dana Corp. decision, it is
unclear whether the preconditions agreement in Adcock would be considered a
violation of section 8(a)(3).
As to the neutrality agreement, the trial court dismissed the suit for failure
to state a claim, holding that execution of the neutrality agreement did not
violate section 302 of the LMRA because it did not constitute the delivery of
“things of value to the Union” by the employer.173
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the employees argued that “a ‘thing of
value’ means anything that has subjective value to the Union.”174 And thus, the
plaintiffs argued, the neutrality agreement constituted a thing of value because
it “benefited the Union’s organizing efforts.”175 This argument is consistent

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 372 (omission in original) (emphasis added).
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012); Adcock, 550 F.3d at 373.
Adcock, 550 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6, 2010).
Adcock, 550 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 374.
Id.
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with the Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Roth, where it stated that
“[v]alue is usually set by the desire to have the ‘thing’ and depends upon the
individual and the circumstances.”176
The Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.177 The court based its holding on three different rationales. First, the
court said that the promises made by the employer simply “involve permitting
the Union access to employees during an organizing campaign,” and that this
type of concession did not involve the payment, loan, or delivery of
anything.178 However, with this argument the court neglected to address the
promise by the employer to remain neutral by “refrain[ing] from making
negative comments about the Union during the organizing campaigns.”179 This
is problematic because the neutrality provision is one of the most important
provisions of a neutrality agreement.180 As discussed in Part II.B, research
suggests that employer opposition to unionization is a major predictor of a
union loss in the NLRB-supervised elections process.181 As such, requiring an
employer to remain neutral is extremely valuable to a union trying to organize
new groups of employees.
The second rationale offered by the court was that its interpretation of
section 302 was consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is “to curb
abuses that Congress felt were ‘inimical to the integrity of the collective
bargaining process.’”182 The court cited Arroyo v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court stated that Congress enacted section 302 of the LMRA because
it was “‘concerned with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of
employee representatives by employers, with extortion by employee
representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of the power
which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their sole control.’”183
The court held that the specific facts of this case “[did] not involve bribery or
other corrupt practices” of the kind section 302 was enacted to prevent.184
176 333 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that “a loan may reasonably be included within the wording
of the statute and that Congress so intended”).
177 Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375, 377.
178 Id. at 374.
179 See id. at 373.
180 See infra Part III; see also Hartley, supra note 13, at 379 (“Union leaders regard employer anti-union
speech as a leading cause of union organizing failure, particularly when orchestrated by labor-management
consultants.”).
181 Hartley, supra note 13, at 379.
182 Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375 (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 (1959)).
183 Id. (quoting Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 425–26).
184 Id.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two facts. First, the court
relied on the fact that in this case “no representative of the Union personally
benefited from these concessions.”185 While this may be true, it is irrelevant
under the plain language of the statute. The plain language of the statute bars
payments of “things of value” to both representatives of the union as well as
the union itself.186 There is simply no requirement that a union employee
personally benefit for the statute to be implicated. Where the court came up
with this requirement is unclear.
Second, the court relied on the fact that the concessions made by the
employer “serve[d] the interests of both [the employer] and the Union, as they
eliminate the potential for hostile organizing campaigns in the
workplace. . . . [And thus, they] certainly [were] not inimical to the collective
bargaining process.”187 This also does not make sense. The fact that something
makes an organizing campaign run more smoothly does not mean that it cannot
be “inimical to the bargaining process.” Smoothing over negotiations is the
exact purpose of bribery. That is why bribery is referred to as “greasing the
wheels.” And yet, bribery is a corrupt practice considered inimical to the
bargaining process.188 Furthermore, the plain language of section 302 makes it
clear that its purpose is to prevent bribery.189 That is why it is concerned with
payments made to unions by employers, or vice versa.
Third, the court noted that its decision was consistent with the approach
taken by the Third Circuit in Hotel Employees.190 The court agreed with the
Third Circuit, specifically quoting the Third Circuit’s argument that the fact
that a neutrality agreement benefits both parties “does not transform it into a
payment or delivery of some benefit.”191 Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit declined to say why it is not “transformed.”

185

Id.
It is a violation of the LMRA “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or
other thing of value . . . to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which represents, seeks
to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer.” Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
187 Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375.
188 See Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 425.
189 See 29 U.S.C. § 186.
190 Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375.
191 Id. at 376 (quoting Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390
F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004)).
186
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Based on these three rationales, the court upheld the decision of the district
court, ruling for the defendants.192
C. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed whether a neutrality agreement can
violate section 302 in Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355.193 In Mulhall, the
plaintiff’s employer entered into a neutrality agreement with the defendant
labor union UNITE HERE.194 Per the neutrality agreement, the employer
promised to “(1) provide union representatives access to non-public work
premises to organize employees during non-work hours; (2) provide the union
a list of employees, their job classifications, departments, and addresses; and
(3) remain neutral to the unionization of employees.”195 In return, the union
promised two things. First, it promised to provide political support for
legislation favorable to the employer.196 The union went on to spend over
$100,000 in support of the legislation.197 Second, the union promised that if it
were successful in obtaining recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit of the
employees it would “refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking, or
undertaking other economic activity against [the employer].”198
Opposed to being unionized, the plaintiff filed suit to enjoin enforcement of
this agreement, alleging that it violated section 302.199 The trial court
dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim because it concluded that the
organizing assistance promised in the neutrality agreement could not constitute
a “thing of value” under section 302.200
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding that a neutrality agreement can constitute a thing of value within the
meaning of section 302 “if demanded or given as payment.”201 In reaching this

192

Id.
667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. The employer in Mulhall was Mardi Gras Gaming, a company that operated casinos and greyhound
racetracks. See id. Mardi Gras enlisted the help of the union, UNITE HERE, to lobby in support of proposed
casino gambling initiatives. Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
193
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conclusion, the court relied on “common sense,” simply stating that “[i]t seems
apparent that organizing assistance can be a thing of value.”202
However, the court made it clear that not all neutrality agreements are
violations of section 302.203 Rather, it is only when these agreements are “used
as valuable consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit
from an employer” that they become illegal.204
The court stated that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that intangible
organizing assistance cannot be paid, loaned, or delivered, and could not
therefore constitute a “thing of value” under section 302, was incorrect because
such assistance can be “paid.”205 The court stated that
[w]hether something qualifies as a payment depends not on whether
it is tangible or has monetary value, but on whether its performance
fulfills an obligation. If employers offer organizing assistance with
the intention of improperly influencing a union, then the policy
206
concerns in § 302⎯curbing bribery and extortion⎯are implicated.

Essentially, the court believed that the Fourth Circuit’s holding was too broad
because it meant that no neutrality agreement could ever constitute a thing of
value, even if the agreement was a part of “a scheme to corrupt a union or
extort a benefit from an employer.”207
The court specifically stated that it need not address the question of
whether something must have monetary value to be considered a “thing of
value” under section 302, because in this case the union spent $100,000 on a
political cause as consideration for the neutrality agreement.208
Finally, the court addressed concerns that its interpretation of section 302
would force employers to “actively oppose unionization in order to avoid

202

Id. at 1215.
See id. (explaining that “an employer does not risk criminal sanctions simply because benefits
extended to a labor union can be considered valuable”).
204 Id.
205 See id.
206 Id.
207 See id.
208 Id. at 1215−16. This statement is unusual, however, considering its earlier statement that “[w]hether
something qualifies as a payment depends not on whether it is tangible or has monetary value, but on whether
its performance fulfills an obligation.” Id. at 1215. Based on this earlier statement, if the Eleventh Circuit had
addressed this question, it likely would have concluded that something does not need to have more than
nominal monetary value to be considered a “thing of value.”
203
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criminal sanctions under § 302.”209 The court stated that this was not a
concern, as employers were free to enter into neutrality agreements, or oppose
unionization, as they saw fit.210 Only when an employer enters into a neutrality
agreement as an improper payment for contract concessions does it violate
section 302.211
The Eleventh Circuit declined to specify when a neutrality agreement
reaches the level at which it becomes improper influence. It simply held that
the plaintiff had stated a claim, and then remanded the case to the lower court
to decide based on the facts whether this specific neutrality agreement
constituted an improper payment in violation of section 302.212
V. ARGUMENT
A. Why the Eleventh Circuit Was Correct
Of the two competing interpretations of section 302 of the LMRA, the
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation is correct for three reasons. First, the
arguments made by the court in the Third and Fourth Circuit opinions are
unconvincing at best. As Professors Eigen and Sherwyn put it in their 2012
piece, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, the “analysis is
woefully lacking in an understanding of the relevant case law and of the nature
of labor relations.”213 For the specific weaknesses of these opinions, see Part
III above.
Second, section 302 makes it illegal for an employer to pay any “thing of
value” to a union, and makes it illegal for a union to receive any “thing of
value” from the employer.214 As previously discussed, neutrality agreements
are extremely valuable to the unions because they can virtually guarantee the
union’s success in unionizing new groups of employees.215 These new union
members must pay monthly dues to the union, which can add up to substantial
sums depending on the number of employees in the bargaining unit.216
Neutrality agreements are of concrete monetary value to the union.
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 1216.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a)–(b), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)−(b) (2012).
See supra Part III.
Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.

BOWNESS GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

PROTECTING EMPLOYEES FROM QUID PRO QUO

6/30/2014 2:01 PM

1527

The fact that unions are willing to spend substantial amounts of money on
efforts to obtain neutrality agreements underscores this point. In Mulhall, for
example, the union agreed to lobby in support of legislation favorable to the
employer.217 The union ended up spending over $100,000 on its lobbying
efforts.218 This fact alone indicates that the neutrality agreement was a “thing”
that the union valued at over $100,000.219 Thus, a neutrality agreement could
logically be considered a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 302
based on the plain language of the statute.220
This obvious argument was not addressed directly by either the Third or
Fourth Circuit in their respective opinions.221 In fact, the Fourth Circuit did not
even address the neutrality part of the neutrality agreement, which is one of the
parts that make these agreements so valuable to unions.222 The court simply
stated that signing the agreement did not constitute “payment or delivery of a
‘thing of value’” because “[t]he concessions provided by Freightliner all
involve permitting the Union access to employees during an organizing
campaign.”223 While the agreement in question did have provisions to this
effect, the heart of the agreement was the neutrality provision, which the court
ignored.224
However, the Fourth Circuit did indicate that concessions like those made
in the agreement “[did] not involve the delivery of either tangible or intangible
items to the Union.”225 Thus, even if the Third and Fourth Circuits had
217 Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012). Recall that in Mulhall the
court stated that it need not address whether something must have monetary value to be considered a thing of
value under section 302 of the LMRA because in that case the neutrality agreement did have monetary value.
Id. at 1215–16. The court cited the fact that the union spent $100,000 on lobbying assistance as consideration
for the agreement as support for this assertion. Id.
218 Id. at 1213.
219 The neutrality agreement is valuable to the employer as well. Imagine, for example, that the employer
were able to bind the union to a mandatory overtime provision with a neutrality agreement. It follows that the
agreement is worth as much to the employer as the additional business generated by the employer’s ability to
force its employees to work overtime.
220 “In determining the meaning of a statute, we examine the statute’s plain language.” Adcock v.
Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United Seniors Ass’n, Inc. v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
423 F.3d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 2005)).
221 See generally Adcock, 550 F.3d 369; Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality
Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004).
222 See generally Adcock, 550 F.3d 369. Recall that unions consider employer intimidation and antiunion
speech one of the principal reasons that unions often fail to organize new bargaining units. See supra notes 57–
84 and accompanying text.
223 Adcock, 550 F.3d at 374.
224 See id.
225 Id.
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addressed the argument that the neutrality provisions of neutrality agreements
are extremely valuable, they likely would have dismissed it on the overly
formalistic grounds that pledging to remain neutral is still a “concession,” and
since concessions cannot be paid, loaned, or delivered226 according to the
court, they are not covered by section 302.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of section 302 is more closely
in line with the purposes of the statute. The purpose of section 302 is to
prevent bribery and corruption in the context of the collective bargaining
process.227 The recent NLRB decision in Dana Corp. has created the potential
for neutrality agreements to be used as part of corrupt quid pro quo
arrangements between unions and employers.
As discussed above, the Dana Corp. decision allows unions to make
substantive contract concessions in exchange for neutrality agreements.228 The
precise extent to which they can do so is left unclear by the Dana Corp.
decision.229 However, in Dana Corp. the union conceded that the first contract
between the union and the employer would contain a provision requiring
mandatory overtime for employees when customers demanded it.230 The
NLRB said that this substantive concession was totally within the bounds of
permissible, pre-recognition negotiations.231
Additionally, the union made substantial concessions in Adcock.232 The
concessions included the following:
(2) there would be “no guaranteed employment or transfer rights
between Business Units or Plants”; (3) there would be “no provisions
for severance pay . . . in the event of a layoff or plant closure”; (4)
there would be “no strikes during the term of any collectively
bargained agreement” [(a common provision)]; . . . and (7) in
consideration of Freightliner’s financial turnaround objectives, there

226

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012).
See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1959); see also Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local
355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012); Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375; Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local
57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2004).
228 See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6, 2010).
229 See id.
230 Id. at *2–3.
231 See id. at *12.
232 See Adcock, 550 F.3d at 372, 376.
227
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would be “no wage adjustments provided at any newly organized
233
facility prior to mid-2003.”

In that case, the NLRB had previously adjudicated the issue of whether these
concessions violated section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.234 The NLRB held that the
parties did violate section 8(a)(2) with this agreement by “bargaining and
entering into an agreement regarding employee terms and conditions . . . prior
to the [Union] enjoying the support of a majority of employees.”235 However,
this case was decided in 2008, two years before the NLRB’s decision in Dana
Corp. This Comment argues that the preconditions agreement in Adcock,
which was illegal in 2008, would be legal under the current standard for prerecognition concessions set by Dana Corp. in 2010.
As a result of the Dana Corp. decision, a union can concede the rights of
employees whom it does not yet represent in exchange for an agreement with
the employer that helps the union gain the right to represent those employees.
By trading contract concessions for the neutrality agreement, the union is
getting the neutrality agreement for free rather than having to pay for it. The
neutrality agreement then allows the union to successfully unionize the new
group of employees, resulting in substantial amounts of money being paid to
the union in the form of dues from the new members.236 In return, the
employer protects itself from the adverse effects of unionization by binding the
union to favorable contract terms before it has unionized the employees.
As Professors Eigen and Sherwyn point out, it is exactly this type of
arrangement that section 302 was designed to prevent.237 In 2012 they wrote,
[A] neutrality agreement granting exclusive collective-bargaining
rights to one union could result in dues of $35 to $50 per month from
thousands of employees. Hundreds of thousands of dollars per month
seems like a thing of value. Would a union, for example, give up its
demands for increases in wages or health and safety measures in
238
exchange for that kind of money and power? Of course it would.

They go on to point out that UNITE HERE made exactly this deal in 2006
when it agreed to concede the demands of the employees it already represented

233
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 372 (first omission in original).
See id. at 373.
Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
Id. at 730−31.
Id. at 730.
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in exchange for a neutrality agreement that would help it organize new
employees at a different facility.239 In a situation like this, the union makes
money, signs up a new group of employees, and the employer gets the
concessions it wants. Everybody wins except for the employees, who are the
very people both the NLRA and the LMRA were designed to protect. This
situation is exactly what section 302 was designed to prevent.240
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mulhall most accurately reflects the
purpose of section 302 because it recognizes the potential for neutrality
agreements to be used in these types of corrupt arrangements, and it allows the
trial court to find violations of section 302 if the court feels that the agreement
is being used as part of a scheme to corrupt the union.241
Of course, sometimes it might very well be in the employees’ best interest
to unionize even if that means sacrificing some rights in the short term so that
the union can obtain the neutrality agreement. The Eleventh Circuit decision in
Mulhall is sensible because it takes this fact into account. Under Mulhall, a
neutrality agreement does not necessarily constitute a section 302 violation.242
Mulhall states that “[e]mployers and unions may set ground rules for an
organizing campaign, even if the employer and union benefit from the
agreement[,] [b]ut innocuous ground rules can become illegal payments if used
as valuable consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit
from an employer.”243 The court followed up this sensible, albeit vague
pronouncement with another vague statement, saying that a neutrality
agreement “does not constitute a § 302 violation unless the assistance is an
improper payment.”244 Essentially, if the court determines that the neutrality
agreement is being used in a way that it considers corrupt, it can find a
section 302 violation.
The Eleventh Circuit has simply recognized the obvious fact that following
the Dana Corp. decision it is possible for an employer to use a neutrality
agreement to contractually bind a union to favorable terms before the election
campaign.245 In return, it promises to remain neutral to the union and agrees to

239
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 730–31.
See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 424–26 (1959).
See Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 731.
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card check recognition.246 These promises then ensure that the union will be
successful in winning the election.247 Thus, the employer can use a neutrality
agreement to mitigate the effects of unionization by ensuring that, if it is
unionized, it is unionized by a union that is contractually bound to give it what
it wants. The union is essentially being bought off. The best part about this
arrangement for the employer is that it does not even have to use its own
money; the employees foot the bill with their membership dues.248
B. An Alternative Framework
For the aforementioned reasons, this Comment argues that the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Mulhall was correct.249 The NLRB’s decision in Dana
Corp. allows employers to use neutrality agreements to bind unions to
favorable contract terms at the expense of employees it does not yet
represent.250 The neutrality agreement then ensures that the union will be
successful in unionizing those employees, binding them to the concessions it
made to the employer.251 By binding the union to favorable terms in advance,
the employer is able to mitigate the effects of unionization. In return, the union
adds a new group of employees to its membership rolls.252 These new
employees must pay dues, which can be substantial.253 The Eleventh Circuit
decision allows the courts to put a stop to these types of quid pro quo
arrangements by finding that they violate section 302 of the LMRA.254 The
Eleventh Circuit was thus correct in Mulhall, and, if heard by the Supreme
Court, the Mulhall decision should be upheld.
Upholding the decision would mean that courts would have the power to
examine the arrangement, determine whether it is benign or corrupt, and, if a
court determines that it is a corrupt quid pro quo arrangement, to then find a
violation of section 302.255 This outcome is much more sensible than the
outcome under the Third and Fourth Circuit’s decisions, where neutrality
agreements cannot violate section 302 of the LMRA.
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 721–22.
Id. at 722.
See id. at 730.
See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215.
See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *1–2 (Dec. 6, 2010).
See supra Part 0.
See Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730.
Id.
See Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215.
See id.
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Despite its virtue, the framework created by the Eleventh Circuit is
cumbersome because it requires judicial review of every questionable
neutrality agreement to determine whether there is a section 302 violation. This
Comment suggests that a better system exists whereby neutrality agreements
would be perfectly legal, as they are now, and there would not be as much
need for judicial review of a neutrality agreement to determine whether it is
being used as an instrument in a scheme to corrupt a union at the expense of
the employees.
1. Structure
First, the Dana Corp. decision should be codified as part of section 8(a)(2)
of the NLRA. This would prevent the decision from being overturned by future
Board appointees who may disagree with it. Under the framework provided by
the Dana Corp. decision, the union and the employer can reach some level of
agreement regarding what the first contract negotiations will look like after the
union achieves recognition.256 They can even agree to some specific,
substantive provisions, such as the mandatory overtime provision in Dana
Corp.257
However, how far the union and employer can currently go in agreeing to
specific provisions without violating section 8(a)(2) is unclear.258 The NLRB
in Dana Corp. “[left] for another day the adoption of a general standard for
regulating prerecognition negotiations between unions and employer[s].”259
The NLRB stated only that determinations as to whether a pre-recognition
agreement violated the NLRA would have to be made on a case-by-case basis,
and that in that case, the parties had “[done] no more than create a framework
for future collective bargaining.”260 Thus, the Dana Corp. decision should not
only be codified in a statute to allow it to withstand changes in board
membership, it should also be clarified. Articulation of a concise standard for
review of pre-recognition neutrality agreements is beyond the scope of this
Comment. This Comment merely suggests that section 8(a)(2) should be
amended to expressly make it legal for the employer to bind the union to some
specific concessions in exchange for signing a neutrality agreement. By

256
257
258
259
260

See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202, at *5–6 (Dec. 6, 2010).
See id. at *2–3.
See id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *8.
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codifying the Dana Corp. decision in an amendment to section 8(a)(2), future
boards will not be able to reverse the decision.
As previously discussed, the Dana Corp. decision creates the potential for
corruption. Thus, second, this Comment argues that section 302 of the LMRA
should be amended to require the union and the employer to disclose the
material provisions of the neutrality agreement to employees prior to the
representation election.261 This way, the employees can simply view the
agreement and then vote on whether they want the union, with the knowledge
of how their rights will be affected if the union wins. If the employees believe
that the union is unfairly conceding their rights to their employer because the
union is after more membership dues, they can vote against unionization. Thus,
employees, rather than judges, will determine which agreements are corrupt
and which are legitimate.
Under this system, the NLRB would be free to develop rules of procedure
for disclosing the terms of the agreement to the employees. The precise nature
of the disclosure rules would best be determined by experts. However, this
Comment suggests that the disclosure rules should, at minimum, require that
the parties hire a third party, such as a private mediator, to explain the terms of
the agreement to the employees.
This is a better system because the employees are better equipped to
determine whether concessions made by the union are in their best interest than
a federal judge who is far removed from the facts of the case. However, should
the union win the election, aggrieved employees could still resort to
challenging the agreement in federal court as violating the Dana Corp. rule,
now codified as part of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.
One might be inclined to take this proposition further and say that in
addition to allowing the union and the employer to set guidelines,262
section 8(a)(2) should be amended to make it perfectly legal for the union and
the employer to negotiate a full employment contract prior to recognition, so
long as it is conditioned on the union winning the election. This proposition,
however, would undermine the purpose of section 8(a)(2), which “was to
eradicate company unionism, a practice whereby employers would establish
and control in-house labor organizations in order to prevent organization by

261
262

Or prior to the solicitation of authorization cards if the agreement contains a card check provision.
E.g., Dana Corp., 2010 WL 4963202, at *1.
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autonomous unions.”263 This Comment suggests that expanding the Dana
Corp. decision this far is a bad idea even if one also requires that the terms of a
pre-recognition agreement be disclosed to employees before they vote or sign
cards. Anything that makes it easier for an employer to establish a company
union should be avoided.
Third, section 302 of the LMRA should also be amended to address
situations where a union already represents employees at one of the employer’s
facilities, but wants to unionize employees at a different facility.264 In 2006,
UNITE HERE was attempting to organize employees at nonunion hotels
owned by a hotel company.265 UNITE HERE already represented employees at
some of the company’s hotels.266 To convince the hotel company to sign a
neutrality agreement, UNITE HERE agreed to concede some of the demands
of the employees it already represented.267
The statutory changes laid out above do nothing to address this situation
because those changes rely on the employees to vote the union down if their
rights are being unfairly conceded. In this situation, the union is conceding the
rights of employees it already represents in exchange for an agreement that
will help it unionize new employees at one of the employer’s other plants.
Thus, the employees voting on unionization are not the ones whose rights are
being sacrificed by the agreement. As a result, the concessions made by the
union are unlikely to concern them.
One solution to this issue would simply be to make it a violation of
section 302 for a union to concede the rights of current members in exchange
for a neutrality agreement that helps it unionize new members. This is a bad
solution, however, as it may very well be in the employees’ best long-term
interest for the union to make such a deal. A better solution would be to add a
provision to section 302 that forces unions to allow existing members to
approve concessions made to obtain a neutrality agreement if those members
would be affected by the concessions. Thus, the employees will decide for
themselves whether it is in their best interest for the union to concede their
rights to their employer in exchange for a neutrality agreement. This result is

263

Id. at *5 (quoting 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 418–19 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
264 See, e.g., Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 730–31.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 Id.
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desirable because employees know what is in their best interest better than a
federal judge who is far removed from the facts of the situation.
2. Enforcement
The Dana Corp. decision left open the question of enforcement. If the
union wins the election, what happens if it then refuses to abide by the terms of
the agreement it reached with the employer before the election?268
Pre-recognition bargaining agreements could be enforced in several ways.
First, the employer could enforce the agreement with a suit for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of the LMRA.269 Second,
the agreement could be enforced with a state law breach of contract suit.270
Third, the agreement could be enforced with a suit “for breach of the union’s
duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act.”271 The first option does not make sense because the
union and the employer have not executed a full collective bargaining
agreement. The second option seems inadequate because the NLRA, a federal
statutory scheme, governs labor relations in the United States. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to provide the employer with a remedy in federal court.
Thus, this Comment suggests that option number three is the most appropriate.
The union’s refusal to honor the agreement should be enforced with a suit for
breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which should be augmented
to require that a union honor any contractual promises made as part of a prerecognition neutrality agreement.272
3. Benefits of Proposed Changes
The statutory changes laid out by this Comment carry with them several
benefits. First, they grant both unions and employers enhanced freedom of
contract. The Supreme Court has stated that the principle of freedom of
contract governs the relationship between the employer and the union selected
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NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 3.
See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012); see also,
e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983).
270 See NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 3.
271 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164; see NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra
note 121, at 2.
272 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164; NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra
note 121, at 2.
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to represent its employees.273 Under the NLRB’s decision in Dana Corp.,
unions and employers are free to negotiate some substantive first-contract
provisions before the union has even begun its election campaign.274 These
provisions would apply to the first employment contract negotiated between
the union and the employer if the union wins the election. The ability to enter
into this type of agreement benefits the union because it gives it more to
bargain with when attempting to secure a neutrality agreement from the
employer. This ability also benefits the employer because it lets the employer
mitigate some of the uncertainty associated with unionization.275 And, by
codifying the Dana Corp. decision as an amendment to section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, this right would be immune to reversal by future Board appointees.
Thus, some degree of certainty will be introduced into this rapidly shifting area
of law.
The changes proposed by this Comment also protect employees by
requiring that the union disclose the terms of any pre-recognition agreement it
reaches with their employer in exchange for a neutrality agreement. Thus,
employees will be able to vote on the union with full knowledge of what union
victory will mean for their rights. This is beneficial because employees are
much better equipped than federal judges to determine whether the employer is
using the neutrality agreement “as valuable consideration in a scheme to
corrupt [the] union.”276 Additionally, should the union win, aggrieved
employees would still be able to challenge the agreement in federal court.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB’s decision in Dana Corp. allows unions to make substantive
contract concessions affecting the rights of employers it does not represent.277
Unions agree to these concessions in exchange for neutrality agreements,
which virtually guarantee that it will be successful in obtaining the right to
represent those employees.278 Once the union successfully unionizes the
employees, it honors the promise it made to the employer to include certain
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See Weiler, supra note 77, at 357–61.
Again, the standard governing how far these negotiations can go should be codified as part of
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. This is a policy issue. As such, this Comment leaves it up to the legislature to
determine the precise standard that should govern.
275 See NLRB Approves Prerecognition Employer–Union Bargaining, supra note 121, at 1.
276 Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012).
277 See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010 WL 4963202 (Dec. 6, 2010).
278 Eigen & Sherwyn, supra note 16, at 722–23.
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bargaining concessions in the first employment contract.279 Despite the
potential for corruption inherent in these types of agreements, the Third and
Fourth Circuit decisions in Hotel Employees and Adcock have made these
agreements immune to challenge under section 302 of the LMRA, the statute
designed to guard against corruption in the collective bargaining process.
Mulhall, the Eleventh Circuit decision splitting with the Third and Fourth
Circuits, correctly recognizes the potential for corruption by holding that in
certain circumstances, these agreements can violate section 302. This holding
is consistent with the plain language of section 302 and the purpose of
section 302. Accordingly, should the Mulhall case reach the Supreme Court, it
should be upheld.
However, the legal framework created by the Eleventh Circuit decision is
cumbersome because it requires judicial review of every neutrality agreement
to determine whether it is a violation of section 302. This Comment suggests
simple changes to section 302 of the LMRA and section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
that would achieve the same equitable result as the Eleventh Circuit decision,
but would reduce the need for judicial review of questionable neutrality
agreements.
First, the Dana Corp. decision should be codified as part of section 8(a)(2)
of the NLRA. Thus, section 8(a)(2) would make it legal for the union and the
employer to agree to guidelines for negotiating the first contract, and even
agree to some specific contract provisions, prior to the unionization campaign.
By codifying the rule from the Dana Corp. decision, it protects the rule from
being overturned by future NLRB members who disagree with the Dana Corp.
decision. The ability of unions to make contract concessions prior to the
unionization campaign makes it easier to acquire neutrality agreements from
employers, which makes it easier for them to win elections. This ability also
benefits employers because it allows them to mitigate, to some extent, the
effects of unionization.280 Preventing the NLRB from changing the Dana
Corp. rule preserves these benefits and introduces some stability to the
dynamic labor relations process.
Second, unions and employers should be forced by statute to disclose all
material provisions of such an agreement to the voting employees prior to the
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See id. at 731.
At the very least, employers can eliminate some of the uncertainty that comes with unionization.
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beginning of all campaign activities.281 No one is better suited to determine
whether a potential contract is in the employees’ best interest than the
employees themselves. Allowing the employees to review the agreement and
determine its validity with their vote on the issue of union representation is a
much more efficient system for screening neutrality agreements for corruption
than leaving it exclusively to litigation in federal court. However, the changes
proposed by this Comment still allow aggrieved employees to challenge the
neutrality agreement in federal court should the union ultimately win the
election. Thus, the courts act as a failsafe, rather than the primary mechanism
by which corruption is detected and eliminated.
Third, unions should be forced by statute to bring concessions to a vote by
the affected employees if those concessions are made for a neutrality
agreement governing another, nonunion facility.
These changes will bring about the same equitable results as the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision. However, they create a much more efficient framework than
that of the Eleventh Circuit opinion. By codifying the holding of the NLRB in
Dana Corp. in section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, future Board members who
disagree with Dana Corp. will not be able to overrule its holding. Thus,
employers can rely on their ability to bind unions to some degree of favorable
contract terms before the unionization campaign. Doing so allows them to
mitigate some of the negative effects of unionization. In return, the unions’
ability to trade substantive contract concessions for neutrality agreements will
enhance their ability to enter these agreements, which will lead to a higher
union election success rate. Finally, requiring the employers and unions to
disclose the material provisions of these agreements to the employees ensures
that the employees’ interests will be protected.
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